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Montreal Protocol 
The Copenhagen Meeting 
by Thomas Geh.ring* and Sebastian Oberthür** 
The Fourth Meeting of the Parties 
to the Montreal Protocol on Substances 
that Deplete the Ozone Layer was held 
atministerial level atCopenhagen from 
23 to 25 November 1992. lt was prece-
ded by a meeting of the Open-Ended 
Working Group elaborating adjusunents 
andamendments of theProtocol and by 
a meeting of the Preparatory Commit-
tee preparing decisions of the Parties. 
The Meeting adopted far-reaching 
decisions in respect of control measu-
res, preferences for developing coun-
tries as well as the institutional structu-
re and adopted another compound 
Amendment to the Protocol. 
Prior to the meeting, the London 
Amendment to the Montreal Protocol 
had entered into force on 10 August 
1992, more than seven months later 
than scheduled. As of 31 October 1992, 
33 out of the 91 Parties to the Montreal 
Prolocol had ratified the London Amend-
ment, including India which acceded 
to the Protocol as amended in June 
1992. 
1. Control Measures 
Background 
Originally the Montreal Protocol 
addressed only two groups of anthro-
pogenic substances that were believed 
to be primarily responsible for the de-
pletion of the ozone layer. In 1987, the 
negotiating parties agrced to reduce 
both the production and consumption 
of five fully halogenated CFCs - chlo-
rine containing compounds used main-
ly as aerosols, refrigerants, solvents, 
cleansing and blowing agents -by 50 % 
until the end of the century. They also 
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agreed to freeze production and con-
sumption of three halons, bromine 
containing compounds with an even 
higher ozone depletion potential as CFCs 
used for fire-extinguishing, by 1992. 
Although other actors, most notably 
the USA, Canadaand theNordic Coun-
tries, considered them essential, fur-
ther measures were not acceptable to 
some major participants in the negotia-
tions, in particular to the EC and Japan, 
not least because they Iacked operable 
substitutes. 
Following from thisconflict, asim-
plified amendrnent procedure was in-
troduced into the Protocol with far-
reach ing im plications for its further de-
velopment. The reduction schedules of 
the, then, two groups of controlled 
substances could be tightened ("adjust-
ed") by a simpledecision of the annual-
ly convened Meeting of the Parties. 
Although such decisions could in theo-
ry be adopted by majority voting, they 
would in practice always be taken by 
consensus. More important, therefore, 
these adjustments enter into force for 
all parties within six months of their 
adoption. The procedure thus effecti-
vely avoids the cumbersome and time-
consuming process of domestic ratifi-
cation to which regular amendments to 
international treaties are subjected. lt 
does not even provide the parties with 
the usual right of international environ-
mental agreements to opt out of oppo-
sed decisions. The adjustment mecha-
nism is thus a means to accelerate the 
revision oflegal provisions to modified 
knowledge and increased margins for 
compromise as they emerge. 
The control measures of 1987, in-
sufficient as they were, sent a strong 
signal to producing and consuming in-
dustries. Consumption of CFCs de~ 
creased almost immediately, while in-
vestments in the development of sub-
stitutes increased considerably. Tue First 
Meeting of the Parties initiated, there-
fore, a major revision of the Protocol 
that was adopted at the Second Meet-
ing in 19901'. Political negotiations werc 
preceded by expert deliberations in the 
four areas of the scientific assessment 
ofknowledge conceming the status and 
future projection of the ozone layer and 
its depletion, its environmental impact 
on the biospherc, technological options 
for reductions, and economic implica-
tions. These meetings produced tech-
nical consensus among the relevant 
experts and cleared the political nego-
tiations from disputes over the inter-
pretation of facts. 
In London, the rcduction schedules 
for the substances already controlled 
were adjusted and considerably tightc-
ned by a decision of the Meeting. The 
adjusted schedules entered into force 
for all parties on 9 March 1991. In 
addition, schedules for several new 
substances were adopted (see Table 1). 
Yet, these measures werc part of a 
compound Amcndment subject to rnti-
fication by the parties. Although the 
range of control measures of the Proto-
col was simultaneously deepened and 
widened, it was also decided in London 
to reconsider a numberof these measu-
res already in 1992 with a view to their 
further tightening. In a resolution, thc 
Parties moreover resolved to regularly 
review the use of certain transitional 
substances, namely partially halogcna-
ted CFCs (HCFCs) used as substitutcs 
for traditional CFCs. In this regard, thc 
London compromise already envisa-
gcd the next step in the development of 
the Protocol. 
Fact Finding 
The Third Meeting of lhe Parties in 
1991 mandated the assessment panels 
to update their reports of 1989 and the 
standing Open-ended Working Group 
to draw conclusions from thcse reports2J. 
Several hundreds of experts from al-
mosl fifty countries were involved in 
the ensuing deliberations. Summaries 
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of their findings were compiled in a 
synthesis report3> that was submitted to 
and discussed by the Wor.king Group 
and formed the technical basis of the 
deliberations. Concerning the state of 
the ozone layer and projections of its 
depletion, the experts agreed that !ar-
ger ozone decreases had been obscrved 
not only in the Antarctic region but also 
in middle and high Iatitudes. These 
ozone losses could be attributed predo-
minantly to surface activities whilc the 
impact of other sources such as super-
sonic aircraft, rockets and space shutt-
les was low. The scientific assessment 
pancl projected a peak of chlorine con-
centrations in the stratosphere around 
2000, while a füll implementation of 
the London control measures would 
lead to the disappearance of the ozone 
hole only in the second half of the next 
century. The panel therefore confirm-
ed the need to strengthen the control 
measures. 
The merged economic and techno-
logical assessment panel reported a 40% 
decrease of world-wide consumption 
ofCFCs below the base-line of 1986. lt 
expected that developed countries' con-
sumption would be reduced by 50 % in 
1992. This implementation of the Pro-
tocol three years ahead of schedule was 
attributed to a greater success in the de-
velopment of substitutes than antici-
pated. Conceming halons, consump-
tion rose until 1988, but then also dec-
reased below the base-Iine of 1986. 
Provided that transitional substances 
such as HCFCs and partially halogena-
ted fluorocarbons (HFCs; see below) 
were available, controlled substances 
could be phased out by 1995-1997. 
Tiglltening Control Measures 
On the basis of these findings, the 
margins of disagreement conceming 
an accelerated phase-out of controlled 
substances was modest. The three major 
producers and consumers of ozone de-
pleting substances- theEC, the United 
States and Japan - declared in Spring 
1992 that they would phase out fully 
halogenated carlxms by the end of 1995. 
Conceming the two groups of con-
trolled CFCs and carbon tetrachloride, 
the EC, the USA and Canada proposed 
a phase-out by 1996. However, where-
as the two North American countries 
favoured the retention of the existing 
third step (50 % reduction in 1995), the 
EC favoured a reduction of 85 % alrea-
dy in 1994. Sweden, Austria, Switzer-
land and Norway proposed a complete 
phase-out by 1995. On methyl chloride 
proposals of the EC (-50 % in 1994, -
100%in1996), USA(-100 % in 1996), 
Canada (-85 % in 1995 and -100 % in 
2000) and the smaller European coun-
tries mentioned (-100%in1995) diffe-
red slightly more. For halons, similar 
phase-out schedules were proposed, but 
an informal halon working team during 
the seventh meeting of the Working 
Group considered a complete phase-
out feasible already in 1994 since con-
siderable halon banks existed. Remain-
ing differences were settlcd at the 
Copenhagen meeting, but were no key 
issue. 
With the reduction schedules adopt-
ed (see Table 1) the major ozone de-
pleting substances are envisaged tobe 
phased out in industrialised countries 
within a few years. They are not likely 
to play a major role in future Meetings 
of the Parties. All these measures are 
subject to amendments. In respect of 
the two originally controlled groups of 
substances they will enter into force 
within six months ofthe Meeting for all 
parties, while in respe.ct ofthe substan-
ces introduced by the London Amend-
ment they become effective only for 
those parties having ratified this Amend-
m~t -
Table 1 : The Development or Control Measures under the Montreal 
Protocol 
Substances Montreal 1987 London 1990 Copenhagen 1992 
(Base-Line) 
CFCs 11,12 mid 1989: freeze mid 1989: freeze mid 1989: freeze 
113,114,115 mid 1993 : -20% 1995: -50% 1994: -75 % 
(1986) mid 1998: -50% 1997: -85% 1996: -100% 
--- 2000: -100% ---
Halons 1211, 1992 : freeze 1992: freeze 1992 : freeze 
1301,2402 --- 1995: -50% 1994: -100% 
(1986) --- 2000: -100% ---
l 0 other CFCs --- 1993: -20% 1993: -20% 
(1989) --- 1997: -85% 1994: -75% 
--- 2000: -100% 1996: -100% 
Carbon tetra- --- 1995: -85% 1995: -85% 
chloride (1989) --- 2000: -100% 1996: -100% 
Methyl --- 1993 : freeze 1993 : freeze 
chlorofonn --- 1995: -30% 1994: -50% 
(1989) --- 2000: -70% 1996: -100% 
--- 2005: -100% ---
HCFCs --- --- 1996 : freeze 
(1989 plus --- --- 2005: -35% 
3.1% ofCFC --- --- 2010: -65% 
consumption --- --- 2015: -90% 
in 1989) --- --- 2020: -99,5% 
--- --- 2030: -100% 
HGFCs --- --- 1996: -100% 
Methybromide --- --- 199 5 : freeze 
(1991) 
Note : All Control measures arc related to production and conswnption of substances exccpt for HCFCs for 
which only restrictions on consumption arc applied. Source : Own compilation 
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New Substances 
In contrast to the comparatively 
smooth development in respect of sub-
stances already subject to control, views 
varied widely conceming the control 
of several new groups of substances. 
One of these groups is made up of 
HCFCs. These substances, of which 
only a few are actually marketable or in 
the process of industrial development, 
have ozone depletion potentials of 
considerable variance which are through-
out lower than those of fully halogenat-
cd CFCs but not at all negligible. HCFCs 
provide a future market of considera-
ble size. For example, the most impor-
tant HCFC 22 already in 1991 reached 
an annual production of about 260 ,000 
tons and production levels are projec-
ted to increase to 500-700,000 tons 
within the 1990s. As transitional sub-
stances HCFCs are relevant for the re-
placement of CFCs, but their uncon-
trolled growth is hardly desirable. Sin-
ce the London Meeting, the concept of 
a cap on these substances had gained 
considerable support. Austria, Norway, 
Sweden and Switzerland proposed to 
limit the production and consumption 
of HCFCs to 2-4 % of CFC consump-
tion in 1986 (base-line) and to restrict it 
to certain uses. From 2000 onwards, 
new equipment containing or produced 
with HCFCs should not be installed, 
and by 2005-2010 the substances should 
be phased out. The European Commu-
nity generally supported the concept of 
a cap, while the U nited S tates favoured 
a restriction of usages and a distinction 
between substances with higher and 
lower ozone depleting potentials. 
Moreover, the two major actors in the 
issue-area insisted on considerably 
longer transitional periods. 
On this basis, a reduction schedule 
was negotiated in Copenhagen that com-
bines the concepts suggested. lt envisa-
ges a consumption cap by 1996 at the 
aggregate of 1989 consumption of 
HCFCs plus 3,1 % of 1989 consump-
tion of CFCs. This percentage was 
disputed until the last minute with the 
United States favouring a higher figu-
re. A complete phase out shall be achie-
ved as late as 2030 over no less than 
five reduction steps. Although compe-
tent in the field of con trol measures, the 
European Community did not speak 
with one voice. France precluded agree-
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ment on a 35 % reduction already by 
2003. The United States, on the other 
hand, insisted on a "tail" for the servic-
ing of existing equipment that led to the 
peculiar final reduction steps. Lastly, 
from 1996 onwards applications of 
HCFCs shall be restricted and control-
led. Considering the past dynamics of 
the Protocol, this schedule may beco-
me subject to some acceleration by 
adjustments in future rounds. 
phase-down of CFCs and methyl chlo-
roform or of halons by three years. 
Large quantities of methyl bromide 
are used for soil fumigation (i.e. as a 
pesticide ca. 85 %) mainly in warmer 
developed countries, including the Me-
diterranean members of the European 
Communily and the United States. 
Methyl bromide is also used for com-
modity fumigation (ca. 15 %) in parti-
cular in developing countries - that is, 
Figure 1: The Impact of Control Measures on the Atmospheric Chlorine 
Loading 
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Another serious conflict arose on 
methyl bromide. Having come up in 
the negotiations only in February 1992, 
this substance is comparatively new on 
the agenda of the ozone regime. Con-
taining bromine, it has a considerable 
ozone depleting potential that is parti-
cularly effective in the short to medium 
term. Restricting its usage would there-
fore considerably alleviate the peak 
load of ozone depleting substances on 
the stratosphere that is believed to occur 
around the year 2000 (see Figure 1). 
The scientific assessment panel esti-
mated that an immediate reduction of 
methyl bromide by only 10 % would be 
comparable to an acceleration of the 
2040 2080 
Source: World Meteorological Organisation 
for food storage, pre-shipment and 
quarantine purposes - and instructural 
fumigationappliances (ca. 5 %). While 
substitutes exist for the first use, this 
had not yet been entirely clear for the 
latter ones. A thorough investigation of 
this chemical had not been part of the 
regular assessment. An interim scienti-
fic, technological and economic as-
sessment was elaborated only in Junc 
1992. 
The matter was brought onto the 
agenda of the regime by the United 
States which will be compelled to ban 
the substance under its Clean Air Act 
once its oz.one depletion potential (about 
0,7) is detennined conclusively. Hen-
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ce, the United States proposed a com-
plete phase-out by 2000. Yet, due to the 
position of its Mediterranean members, 
the European Community did not ac-
cept more than a freeze in 1995, while 
the developing countries rejected any 
obligations conceming this substance. 
However, the fiercest protest to its in-
clusion into the Protocol came from 
Israel whose delegation was almost 
entirely composed of representatives 
of the interested industry that makes 
Israel a major producer and exporter of 
methyl bromide. 
Against this background, the Co-
penhagen Meeting agreed only on a 
freeze of consumption and production 
of methyl bromide in 1995. Yet this 
initial step is important because, once 
the Copenhagen Amendment enters into 
force, the substance will be subject to 
the simplified adjustment procedure. 
The scientific and technological as-
sessment panels are requested to sub-
mit infonnation about the substance in 
time for consideration by the Open-
Ended Working Group prior to the 
Seventh Meeting of the Parties in 199 5. 
Moreover, the Parties resolved in a 
Resolution to decidenotlaterthan 1995 
on reduction targets beginning at the 
latest in 2000. 
As the last group of new substan-
ces, bromine containing halogenated 
hydrocarbons (HBFCs) did not pose 
major difficulties. Their control and 
immediate phase-out merely constitu-
tes a precautionary measure. lt does not 
affect vested economic interests since 
these substances are not yet marketed. 
In contrast, HFCs, another group of 
substitutes for CFCs, have not been 
addressed expressly. These substances 
do not contain chlorine or bromine and 
are therefore not ozone depleting, but 
they have a significant global warming 
potential. lt is not clear whether they 
fall into the regulatory competence of 
the ozone regime, although their eco-
nomic relevance is contingent upon the 
measures adopted here. The scientific 
assessment panel was mandated to 
scrutinise the global warming potential 
of transitional substances in general 
but an initial express reference to RFCs 
in that decision proposed by the Ne-
therlands stirred the protest of the ob-
serving chemical industry and was la-
ter deleted at the request of the United 
Kingdom. 
2. System of Preferences for Deve-
loping Countries 
For the long-tenn success of the 
regime for the protection of the ozone 
Iayer a global participation is crucial 
that includes both industrialised and ( at 
least the major) developing countries. 
The Protocol as of 1987 comprised pri-
marily the Western industrialised 
(OECD-) countries. This comparative-
ly small group caused about 80 % of the 
production and consumption of the 
original ozone depleting substances. 
From Eastern Europe only the Soviet 
Union took an active part in the nego-
tiations. Most developing countries that 
became early parties to the Protocol 
had only a marginal impact on the state 
of the ozone layer. The major develo-
ping countries with both large potential 
domestic markets and the technologi-
cal ability to produce CFCs and halons 
inlargequantities (such as Brazil, India 
and China) stayed apart. 
As a first step of a positive encoura-
gement system the original Montreal 
Protocol contained a ten-year grace 
period applicable to developing coun-
tries with an annual per capita con-
sumption below a certain limit (so-
called Article-5.l. countries). Reduc-
tion targets and dates of the Protocol 
are thus applicable only for industriali-
sed and very few developing countries 
exceeding this level, namely (from the 
current parties) Bahrain, Malta, Singa-
pore and the United Arab Emirates4>. 
For all other developing countries the-
se targets and dates are automatically 
extended by ten years. 
The 1990London Amendmentela-
borated the preferential treatment. lt 
established a financial and technologi-
cal assistance mechanism. lts core is 
constituted by a Multilateral Fund that 
shall meet incremental costs incurred 
by Article 5.1. countries in the course 
of the transfer of their economies to 
ozone-friendly technologies. The Fund 
should discharge its task in carefully 
negotiated collaboration with three exi-
sting international organisations, na-
mely UNEP, UNDP and the World 
Bank. But it was tobe supervised by an 
Executive Committee responsible to 
the Meeting of the Parties. The effecti-
ve start of this Fund was, however, 
contingent upon the entry into force of 
the London Amendment. The Second 
Meeting of the Parties, therefore, estab-
lished on the basis of a simple Decision 
an Interim Multilateral Fund. Its size 
for the first three years (1991-1993) 
was fixed at US $ 160 m, with a possi-
ble extension to US $ 240 m if "other 
countries" (referring to China and India) 
joined the Protocol (while Brazil had 
already done so). lt was understood 
that the obligations of developing coun-
tries arising under the Protocol were 
contingent upon the satisfactory opera-
tion of this mechanism. The fear of the 
developing countries of not being able 
to fulfil their obligations because the 
necessary technology could not bc 
obtained on the market is reflected in a 
specific settlement procedure for such 
problems (cf. Article 5.6 and 5.7). 
The Interim Fund began to operate 
in 1991. lt has financed the exploration 
of 39 country programmes. Nine of 
them covering about 20 % of consump-
tion of controlled substances by Article 
5.1 countries have already been ap-
proved, including those for China, Me-
Table 2 : Coverage of the Montreal Protocol 
Instruments of Ratification etc. as of 1 November 
Parties 1989 1990 1991 1992 
Industrial Countries 29 incl. EC 33 33 36 
Devcloping Countries 20 33 41 55 
Total 49 66 74 91 
Source : Own calculation, figures from Document UNEP/Ozl.Rat 18 
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xico, Brazil, Malaysia, Egypt and Jor-
dan. Upon ratification by China, the 
Third Meeting of the Parties raised the 
three-yearFundto US $200m (i.e. US 
$ 73,3 m for 1992). However, by No-
vember 1992, US $ 11,6 m out of the 
agreedcontributionsofUS $53,3 m for 
1991 were still outstanding. This was 
due in particular to the performance of 
France and the Russian Federation. 
At the Copenhagen Meeting this 
system of preferential treatment of de-
veloping countries was a major issue of 
dispute that consisted of three inter-
connected elements, namely the amount 
of the Fund in the years to come, the 
status of the Fund, and the applicabili-
ty of the tightened and widened control 
measures to developing countries. 
lt was widely accepted that the 
amount of the Fund should be increas-
ed upon ratification of the Protocol by 
India, as envisaged in London. While 
some donor countries (especially Ja-
pan) interpreted this to mean an asses-
sed contribution ofUS $ 80 m for 1993 
(i.e. one third of the now US $ 240 m), 
the Fund Secretariat calculated diffe-
rently : lt took the US $ 240 m as a basis 
and subtracted the assessed contribu-
tions for 1991 (US $ 53,3 m equal to 
one third ofUS $ 160 m) and for 1992 
(US $ 73,3 m e.qual to the half of US $ 
200 m minus the 1991 contribution). lt 
thus reached an assessed contribution 
of US $ 113,3 m for 1993. This sum 
(although not its calculation) was vir-
tually undisputed. 
However, the major donor coun-
tries refused to determine the size of 
the Fund for 1994, let alone the upco-
ming three year period (1994-1996). 
This approach did not only abandon the 
concept of a three-year rolling budget 
agreed in London. lt also threatened to 
preclude any clarity about the future 
size of the Fund. The size of the 1994 
~udget, for example, would be deter-
mined only by October or November 
1993, too late not only for medium 
term work plans of the Fund and the be-
nefiting developing countries but pro-
bably also for the accommodation of 
contributions into the domestic bud-
gets of contributors. In a compromise 
the Meeting refrained from deciding 
the exact figures but determined mar-
gins. The Fund budget of 1994 will, ac-
cordingly, not be less that that of 1993 
(i.e. US $113,3 m). And the three-year 
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budget for 1994-1996 will be between 
US $ 340 m and US $ 500 m. The 
annual budget will thus not be lower 
than in 1993 and 1994, butthe aggrega-
te might rise to a figure identified by 
the Fund Secretariat. Further decisions 
will be taken at the Fifth Meeting of the 
Parties in 1993 on the basis of a review 
of the performance of the Fund since 
1991. 
Closely related was a conflict on 
the future status of the Fund. Accord-
ing to the London compromise, that 
comprised, inter alia, the Amendment 
of the Protocol and the terms of refe-
rence of the Fund and the supervising 
Executive Committee~, the Interim Mul-
tilateral Fund established on the basis 
of a Decision by the Meeting of the 
Parties should be transferred into the 
regular Multilateral Fund established 
under the arnended Protocol. This see-
ming formality was challenged by a 
number of European donor countries, 
in particular by France, ltaly, the Ne-
therlands and the United K.ingdom. These 
countries favoured the continuation of 
the Interim Fund and the decision at a 
later stage on its transfer into a specific 
window of the Global Environmental 
Facility (GEF). A reason appeared to 
be the desire of the ministries of finan-
ce concemed to establish a single 
comprehensive mechanism for the fi-
nancing of environmental aid. Yet, for 
this purpose the structure of the GEF 
which is still under the control of the 
World Bank had to be considerably 
modified as envisaged by the financial 
mechanism of the UN Framework 
Convention on Global Climate Change 
and the UN Convention on Biological 
Diversity6l. Whereas in London the 
United States as the largest donor had 
insisted on a strong involvement of the 
W orld Bank, it favoured now the smooth 
transfer of the Fund to its new legal 
basis. So did several small industriali-
sed countries. For the developing coun-
tries the funding mechanism constitu-
tes the core of the regime. They vigo-
rously refused to participate in further 
meetings of the Preparatory Commit-
tee (so that the Committee could not 
meet for its two sessions on Friday, 20 
November) until the small group of 
donor countries withdrew its proposal 
and the establishment of the regular 
Fund was generally agreed. 
Lastly, the developing countries, 
led by India and Malaysia, refused to 
enter into any new obligations in the 
field of control measures beyond those 
adopted at London. They argued that 
an adjustment and tightening of control 
measures as agreed by the industriali-
sed countries might not be implemen-
table by them as their phase-out plans 
were oriented by the London targets. 
Beyond that, little experience had been 
gained conceming the transition of their 
economies. The developing countrics 
did not, therefore, any more accept an 
automatic entry into force of the con-
trol measures agreed by the industriali-
sed countries with a ten year grace 
period. Instead, they requested a gene-
ral exemption from new obligations 
until the comprehensive review of their 
situation envisaged for 1995, that in-
cluded the issues of the availability of 
the necessary technology and the satis-
factory operation of the financial me-
chanism. 
Further decisions could be adopted 
on the basis of this review. To promote 
the proposal, India threatened effecti-
vely to preclude any consensus on new 
control measures whatsoever. As a re-
sult, the Meeting of the Parties adopted 
as part of the Copenhagen Amendment 
an addition to paragraph 1 of Article 5 
and a new paragraph 1 bis including an 
automatic application of the new con-
trol measures to developing countries 
and enabling the Meeting of the Parties 
to decide before 1996 (i.e. in 1995) on 
reduction targeL~ and dates applicable 
tothis groupofparties withoutafurthcr 
formal amendment of the Protocol. 
3. Institutional Malters 
The international regime for the 
protection of the ozone layer did not 
lead to an extensive new bureaucracy. 
In contrast to traditional international 
organisations the three Secretariats (joint 
Secretariat of the Vienna Convention 
and the Montreal Protocol in Nairobi 
and Secretariat of the Fund in Mont-
real) have remained small and have not 
acquired an autonomous existence. They 
are affiliated to UNEP. lnstead, the 
core of the institutional structure of the 
regime is formed by its annual Meeting 
of the Parties. lt is this Meeting that 
assures the continued ability of the 
contracting parties to decide collecti-
vely on matters of their common con-
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cern. The regime comprises a compre-
hensive process of communication 
among its members and is thus more 
than a simple international treaty amen-
ded from time to time7>. This is particu-
larly important in two respects. Thein-
terpretation of the obligations entered 
into is not left to the parties individual-
ly. lt can be, and frequently is, dischar-
ged by them collectively. Likewise, 
conflicts about the compliance record 
of parties, or incidents of clear non-
compliance, may be discussed and 
decided upon by the Parties collective-
ly. 
Decisions 
In their past Meetings, the Parties 
have adopted a multitude of decisions 
on their collective interpretation of trea1y 
provisions and related issues. The most 
important of these decisions was no 
doubt, the establishment of the Interim 
Multilateral Fund prior to the entry in to 
force of the London Amendment. The 
Copenhagen Meeting also took deci-
sions on a number of questions of com-
mon concems. 
Several parties are members of the 
Montreal Protocol of 1987 but have not 
yet ratified the London Amendment of 
1990. However, another group of par-
ties, that has already ratified the Amend-
ment, is bound by its provisions. From 
the parallel existence of two separate 
legal instruments, conflicts arise espe-
cially in the area of trade restrictions. 
Accordingly, the Meeting of the Par-
ties decidedthat theexportofthe origi-
nally controlled substances (Article 4.2 
of the London Amendment) shall apply 
only to countries that are not members 
ofthe Montreal Protocol of 1987. And 
that export restrictions of the London 
substances (Annex B) according to 
Article 4 bis shall commence only in 
August 1993. This refers to EC provi-
sions envisaging a ban of these sub-
stances already beginning in January 
1993, at a time at which some South-
East Asian importers will not have ra-
tified the London Amendment. Final-
ly, an exemption from trade restric-
tions has been adopted for the benefit 
of Colombia that is not yet a party to the 
Protocol but fulfilled the conditions of 
Article 4 .8 that allows for such exemp-
tions in case of countries complying 
with the control measures of the Proto-
col and submitting data to that effect. 
So far the Protocol distinguishes 
economically between two groups of 
countries, those ( developing) countries 
Operating under Article 5.1 and those 
not doing so. lt obliges the latter group 
not only to comply with the regular 
schedules, but also to contribute to the 
Fund. There is no specific status for 
"countries with economies in transi-
tion", as is provided for in the Climate 
Change Convention. South Africa bad 
therefore proposed to introduce such 
intermediate status. The Meeting of the 
Parties should be enabled to confer the 
status to a party and to exempt it from 
Part or all of its obligations conceming 
both the reduction of controlled sub-
stances and the contribution to the Fund. 
The proposal was supported by the 
Russian Federation which is widely 
believed tobe incapable of complying 
with the control measures as weil as 
with its financial Obligations under the 
Protocol. lt was rejected, however, by 
the developing countries, fearing that 
the overall size of the Fund might dec-
rease if countries were exempted from 
their Obligations to contribute, as well 
as by the industrialised countries. 
However, it was generally recognised 
that countries might not be in a position 
to fulfil part or all of their obligations. 
The Meeting of the Parties considered 
itself competent to decide in these cases 
without a particular enab/ing clause. 
In this regard, the Meeting was faced 
with concrete requests from Hungary, 
Bulgaria and Poland to be exempted 
from contributions to the Fund in hard 
currency for the years 1991-1993. Yet, 
the matter was assigned to the Executi-
ve Committee and the Fund Secretariat 
since in certain circumstances contri-
butions may be made in kind. (See also 
page 51) 
Non-Compliance Procedure 
The supervision of the compliance 
record of the parties and opportunities 
to react collectively to incidents of 
non-compliance is crucial for the stabi-
lity and effectiveness of sectoral legal 
systems such as the ozone regime. 
Whereas the Protocol envisages the 
elaboration of procedures and institu-
tional mechanisms for this purpose 
(Article 8), the Second Meeting of the 
Parties adopted only a provisional non-
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compliance procedure1> • lt provided 
means for the amicable and non-judi-
cial solution of disputes over the per-
formance of parties. While the dispute-
settlement clause of the Vienna Con-
vention (Article 11), that is also appli-
cable to conflicts arising under the 
Protocol, addresses bilateral disputes 
between two (or a limited number of) 
parties, the non- compliance procedure 
addresses situations in which the com-
munity of parties is faced with non-
compliant behaviour by an individual 
party. 
On the basis of the provisional pro-
cedure and a set ofproposals submitted 
by the European Community a com-
prehensive non-compliance mechanism 
has been developed by a legal expert 
group and adopted by the Copenhagen 
Meeting.(See also page 51) The me-
chanism may be triggered in three ways, 
either by a complaint of one or more 
parties regarding the implementation 
of another party, or by a party that 
considers itself temporarily unable to 
fulfil its obligations, or by the Secreta-
riat. In this last way, information recei-
ved, for exarnple, from an NGO may 
enter the process even if not channelled 
through a State party. An Implementa-
tion Committee con-sisting of ten coun-
tries shall review the information sub-
mitted, request further information as 
appropriate and (upon invitation of the 
party concemed) even gather informa-
tion in the territory of that party. While 
it shall generally seek amicable solu-
tions, decisions on recommendations 
to the Meeting of the Parties shall be 
adopted without the participation of 
the parties concerned. Eventually, the 
highest decision-making body of the 
regime, the Meeting of the Parties, will 
decide the matter. 
Tue Copenhagen Meeting therefo-
re also adopted an indicative list of 
measures that might be taken by the 
Meeting of the Parties (See also page 
52). Thesemeasuresrefertoappropria-
te assistance, issuing cautions, and sus-
pension of specific rights and privile-
ges arising under the Protocol. The 
Meeting did not, how-ever, adopt an 
indicative list ofpossible situations for 
non-compliance with the Protocol as 
proposed by the European Communi-
ty. Several of these situations were 
widely agreed, e.g. non-compliance with 
control measures, with trade restric-
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tions and with data reporting obligations. 
However, the United States vigorously 
refused to. accept that the failure to 
contribute to theFundconstituted such 
a situation since it considered contribu-
tions as "voluntary". Some other coun-
tries, in particular China, denied that 
non-compliance with obligations ari-
sing from decisions of the Parties con-
stituted such situations. They held that 
decisions did not have the same legal 
status as contractual obligations. Re-
jections were thus founded in general 
political and legal considerations. In-
stead of adopting an incomplete list, 
the proposal was dropped altogether. 
In consequence, the Implementation 
Committee will decide itself upon the 
status of contributions to the Fund and 
of Decisions of the Parties once it is 
concemed with specific cases in this 
respect. In a separate Decision the Parties 
decided that cases of developing coun-
tries operating under Article 5.1 and 
exceeding the consumption levels of 
this Article shall be dealt with by the 
Implementation Committee. 
4. Conclusion 
Tue Copenhagen Meeting revised 
the legal structure of the regime by a 
number of far-reaching Decisions and 
a compound Amendment of the Proto-
col text. Tue meeting completed the in-
stitutional structure of the regime by 
the adoption of a non-compliance pro-
cedure that may constitute an instru-
ment for ensuring the effective imple-
mentation of control measures not only 
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by pressuring States towards fulfilling 
their obligations but also by providing 
necessary assistance to this end. Fur-
ther developments cannot be anticipa-
ted in this area. 
As to control measures, reduction 
schedules have been significantly ac-
celerated. As far as industrialised coun-
tries are concerned, the most important 
ozone depleting substances, that is, the 
originally controlled chemicals, will 
cease tobe on the agenda of the regime. 
However, focus has been directed at 
transitional substances and chemicals 
that have so far escaped the regulatory 
attention. Reduction schedules for the-
se substances must be worked out and 
may be accelerated. This is expected to 
take place in the next round of negotia-
tions prior to the Seventh Meeting of 
the Parties (1995). One major task of 
the coming years may well be to secure 
the compliance of all parties, in parti-
cular of the "countries with economies 
in transition", with their obligations. 
Another important item on the futu-
re agenda of the ozone regime will be 
the strengthening and effective imple-
mentation of control measures applying 
to developing, (article 5.1) countries. 
This task depends on the effective func-
tioning of a transfer of financial resour-
ces and technology. The Copenhagen 
Meeting reinforced lhe Multilateral Fund 
as the core of the system of preferential 
conditions for developing countries. Tue 
perfonnanceofthe funding mechanism 
will be under continuous supervision. 
In 1995 the Parties will undertake a 
major review of this mechanism and 
decide on new obligations for develo-
ping countries. 
The Fourth Meeting of the Parties 
to the Montreal Protocol thus proved 
once again the nature of the ozone 
regime as a dynamic international en-
vironmental institution. Adapting quick-
ly to newly emerging scientific and 
political consensus, and supporting, in 
turn, the generation of such consensus, 
the case of ozone may well serve as the 
example of successful international co-
operation forother environmental regi-
mes currently developing, in particular 
for the regimes on climate change and 
biodiversity. 0 
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